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TRIAL DELAY INDEMNITY-INSURING OUR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE MACHINERY
I. Historical Background
Of the eighteenth century critics of French criminal procedure, Voltaire
was perhaps the most caustic.1 Victimized by a grossly unfair criminal justice
system, he frequently struck out venomously at the government which acquiesced
in the system's inequities and misdealings' But Voltaire's aim was not merely
the wholesale discrediting of the justice system. His views were often thoroughly
constructive, particularly where the rights of the innocent accused were con-
cerned.
One of Voltaire's principal contentious was that the State was morally obli-
gated to compensate, monetarily, innocent victims of criminal justice.' On one
occasion, in referring to French criminal procedure in general, but in particular
to the much maligned Criminal Ordinance of 1670, he queried, "Should it not
be as favorable to the innocent as it is terrible to the guilty?"4 Not until 1766
did this rhetorical question elicit a decisive, affirmative response. It was in that
year that Frederick the Great of Prussia, a long-time admirer of Voltaire's com-
pensation theories, signed into law an act authorizing payment by the State of a
just indemnity to persons arrested, detained or released, and subsequently found
innocent.5
I Montesquieu and Beccaria were also outspoken in the area of criminal procedure reform.
Montesquieu kept to general ideas, favoring fixed laws that left nothing to the discretion of the
judge. Beccaria, though concerned with the details of reform (i.e., the necessity for fixed
punishments, abolishment of secret accusations and torture, etc.) was not particularly daring
in his demands. A. ESMEIN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 362-64 (1968).
2 Between 1716 and 1726 Voltaire was twice imprisoned in the Bastille. He was first
incarcerated for having written verses against King Philippe d'Orleans, and the second oc-
casion was the result of a quarrel with a dissolute young nobleman, the Chevalier de Rohan.
A. NoyEs, VOLTAIRE 43, 88 (1936).
That Voltaire was not one to mince words in decrying the irresponsibility of his government
in regard to criminal justice is illustrated vividly by these remarks:
... But, I ask, is not the extreme rigor of your criminal practice, the cause of
his disobedience? A man is accused of a crime, you proceed to immure him immedi-
ately in a frightful dungeon; you suffer no one to have communication with him;
he is loaded with fetters as if already convicted. The witnesses who testify against
him are examined in secret and in his absence. . . . And, if circumstances admitted
by the accused when interrogated, be differently related by the witness, that alone
will be sufficient grounds for ignorant or prejudiced judges to condemn an innocent
man.
Voltaire in a commentary on BEccARIA, Essay on Crimes and Punishments 233-34 (Reprint
1953).
3 In the same commentary Voltaire noted that:
[Iln France, an innocent man who has been immured in a dungeon, who has under-
gone torture, has no consolation . .. to hope for, no one to look to for damages; and
he returns to society with a ruined reputation.
Id. at 229.
4 VOLTAIRE, Commentaire du Traiti des dMlits et des peines, ch. XXIII as cited in A.
EsMEIN, supra note 1, at 365.
5 The act, Neue Verordnung um die Prozesse zu KiUzen § 9 (1766), reads as follows:
If a person suspected of a crime has been detained for trial, and where ... he
has been released from custody, and in the course of time his complete innocence is
established, he shall not only have complete costs restored to him, but also a sum
of money as just indemnity to all circumstances of the case payable from the funds of
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Although Prussia was the first of the European countries to give statutory
recognition to the theory of compensating acquitted individuals for pretrial in-
justice, many other European states were soon to follow in her legislative foot-
steps. By 1932 twelve European countries or municipalities, including Sweden,
Norway, Denmark and Germany, had enacted laws to compensate innocent
detainees.' As of 1969, Portugal and Greece had been added to the list.'
While the legislative action of our European neighbors in the field of in-
demnification has been quite innovative and indeed commendable, it is highly
improbable that their system of compensation for pretrial injustice would fit
properly into our constitutional mold. A modification of it, however, might very
well be adaptable.
Under the United States Constitution, the basis for a valid arrest is prob-
able cause.' Once arrested, a defendant is entitled to a reasonably speedy trial.'
Considering this joint premise, it is submitted that blanket adoption of the Euro-
pean rule of compensating every legally arrested but subsequently acquitted indi-
vidual would possibly have a corrosive effect on the probable cause basis for
arrest. Predictably, such rule would encourage slipshod probable cause deter-
minations by police and magistrates, since the temptation would be great for
these officials to adopt a "no harm" rationale; that is, the incentive for scrutiniz-
ing the basis for probable cause would wane since the accused would always
the trial court, so that the innocent person may be compensated for the injuries he
has suffered.
E. BoRcHtuAR, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 381 '(1932).
6 Id. at 387. Other countries and municipalities compensating innocent detainees as of
1932 were Hungary, Holland, Berne, Freiburg, Neuchatel, Basel, and Tessin. Countries which
passed laws granting an indemnity only for unjust or erroneous conviction included France,
Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Brazil, and Spain. Id.
In regard to England, Samuel Romilly-largely influenced by the theories of Jeremy
Bentham-introduced a bill in Parliament in 1808 providing compensation for erroneously
convicted persons. Although the bill was eventually withdrawn, it should be noted that
England on several occasions has compensated erroneously convicted persons by acts of
Parliament. Id. at 383.
7 G. MUELLER & F. LB POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 104
(1969). It is worthy of note that the European Convention on Human Rights and the United
Nations Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights both contain provisions granting an
innocent victim of pretrial detention an enforceable right to compensation against the State. Id.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis
supplied.)
For cases interpreting the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment see Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 '(1964); Bailey v. United
States, 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. (Emphasis supplied.)
For cases defining the limits of the speedy trial right see: Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77
(1905); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1
(1959); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Dickey v. Florida, 398 ULS. 30 (1970);
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 '(1971); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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be entitled to monetary compensation if the determination lacked adequate
support.
Clearly, the better plan for the United States would be to retain stringent
guidelines for the determination of probable cause, and then to permit justice
to run its course in an orderly, expeditious manner after arrest."0 The right to
compensation would thus arise specifically in the instance where the government's
delay in conducting an "orderly and expeditious" prosecution against a later
acquitted or dismissed individual exceeded all limits of reasonableness. Hence,
the modification necessary for bringing the European paradigm within the
bounds of our constitutional framework would be a preestablished reasonable
time limit for prosecutions-a de minimis standard. With the adoption of such
modification, if the acquitted defendant's trial were delayed by the State beyond
this reasonable time frame, the defendant-provided that he met certain other
qualifications-would be eligible to bring a claim for indemnity against the
State; hence the theory of trial delay indemnity.
In the paragraphs which follow, the purpose, justification, and practicality
of adopting a trial delay indemnity system in the United States will be examined.
Several public compensation statutes already in existence will be analyzed to-
gether with United States Supreme Court decisions relating to trial delay in
order to insure an eclectic approach, and to provide background information to
assist in the difficult task of designing meaningful legislation.
II. Purpose
Mr. Edwin Borchard, former Professor of Law at Yale University and
perennial advocate of compensation for innocent victims of criminal justice,
once remarked:
... Were it not for historical reasons, it would seem strange that the pro-
tection of the individual against official wrongs should, so far as concerns
indemnity, have been so long neglected .... [E]xceptional losses due to the
imperfections of administration should not be permitted to rest where they
fall, but should be distributed over the group as a whole."- (Emphasis
supplied.)
Mr. Borchard's comment neatly identifies the principal objective of a trial delay
indemnity scheme. Primarily, it would right official wrongs-that is, provide
direct compensation for innocent individuals suffering damages due to State-
caused trial delay. Society, in effect, would be insuring its criminal justice sys-
tem against mishap or malfunction. But even aside from its principal purpose,
it might serve additional useful functions. For example, it could serve as a check
on court administrative efficiency, particularly in the near future when computer
programming methods and trained court administrators become commonplace
in our judicial system. 2 Indemnity paid to innocent defendants would provide
10 See Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959), in which the Supreme Court stated,
"While justice should be administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly ex-
pedition and not mere speed."
11 E. BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 376.
12 This day may approach sooner than we might be inclined to predict. The city of
[April, 1973]
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a device for gauging the relative efficiency of both the administrator and the
prosecutor. A "clean slate" at the conclusion of a particular year would indicate
topflight efficiency and perhaps merit recognition in the form of a bonus. On
the other hand, a deluge of claims for indemnity would possibly indicate inatten-
tiveness on the part of the administrator or incompetence on the part of the
prosecutor, either of which might suggest the need for a replacement.
III. Justification
It seems logical that a trial delay indemnity scheme should be commended
to legislators for consideration only upon a finding that certain conditions exist:
(1) that substantial delay occurs in the conduct of criminal trials; (2) that a
significant number of defendants are subsequently acquitted or dismissed; and
(3) that individuals so acquitted or dismissed suffer actual damages. There is
much evidence to suggest that all three of these conditions currently prevail.
A. Existence of Delay
In 1970 Chief Justice Burger, lamenting the deplorable amount of delay
in processing federal criminal cases, noted with concern that in the past few
years in all district courts, the time lapse from indictment to sentence had more
than doubled .13 Recent statistics tend to indicate that delay of criminal trials
is equally critical at the state and city court levels. For example, in Passaic and
Denver has used a computer effectively for preliminary scheduling of criminal cases since 1967,
and such use of computer techniques for criminal docket control has been publicly commended
by prominent judicial figures, including Chief Justice Burger. See ABA COMM. ON ELECTRONIC
DATA RETRIEVAL, COMPUTERS AND THE LA-w 71 (1966); Navarro & Taylor, An Application
of Systems Analysis to Aid in the Efficient Administration of Justice, 51 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 47
(1967); Forward March! In Judicial Administration, 57 A.B.A.J. 860 (1971).
Other innovations helping to bring about improved standards in judicial administration
include the Court Executives Act, 28 U.S.C. § 332(e) (1970) authorizing an executive officer
for each of the eleven federal circuits, the establishment of the National Center for State Courts,
the creation of the Institute for Court Management at the University of Denver, and the insti-
tution of state-federal judicial councils in forty of the fifty states. Forward March! In Judicial
Administration, supra; Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary, 57 A.B.A.J. 855 (1971).
13 Burger, State of the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 930 (1970). Evidence presented before
a United States Senate subcommittee indicated that in 1968, the median time interval for
processing a criminal case (from filing of indictment to final disposition) exceeded six months
in nine federal districts. Hearings on S. 952 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 9 1st Cong., 1st
Sess. 513-15 (1969). A breakdown of figures on median time intervals from filing to disposition
of criminal defendants in Federal District Courts for the years 1967-68 is as follows:
Guilty Court Jury
Court Total Dismissed Plea Trial Trial
No. Mos. No. Mos. No. Mos. No. Mos. No. Mos.
'68 1,892 9.5 282 10.4 896 8.8 120 9.1 594 10.1
Dist. of
Columbia
'67 1,011 7.8 149 8.4 444 5.5 67 8.9 351 10.1
'68 31,843 2.9 4,981 7.5 22,055 2.2 1,668 4.6 3,139 5.8Other ___ _______
89 Courts
'67 31,535 2.5 4,196 7.3 23,131 1.9 1,449 3.9 2.759 5.7
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
269 (1968), 269 (1967).
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Essex counties, New Jersey, during 1965, median times in felony cases from ac-
cusation to trial were approximately 13 and 12 months, respectively. 4 Further,
the results of a trial delay study published in 1972 indicated that the average
arrest-to-trial interval for jailed defendants in one county in Indiana was more
than twice the interval recommended by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The same interval for bailed defend-
ants in another county in that state was more than four times the suggested
limit. 5 As for city courts, a 1967 survey showed that in the Recorder's Court
of the city of Detroit, eighteen per cent of the felony defendants incarcerated
prior to trial were detained in excess of 90 days. 6 While a comprehensive
analysis of criminal trial delay statistics on a nationwide basis is beyond the
scope of this discussion, the data presented above indicates to a reasonable degree
of conclusiveness that delays in criminal trials are prevalent at all government
levels.
B. Acquitted Defendants
That a significant number of arrested persons are subsequently acquitted,
or their cases dismissed, is also a well-documented fact. The Uniform Crime
Reports for the United States published by the F.B.I. for the years 1968 and
1970 offer an enlightening comparison. The consolidated chart on the following
page, based upon a survey of over 2,500 cities, indicates that as the incidence of
several categories of felonies increased, so too did the percentage of acquittals and
dismissals.'
14 U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 80 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: COURTS].
15 Statistics on average arrest-to-trial intervals recorded by the Notre Dame University
joint law school-engineering school study are as follows:
Jailed Defendants Bailed Defendants
St. Joseph County 144 days 333 days
Marion County 165 days 295 days
2 SYSTEMS STUDY IN COURT DELAY (LEADICS) 102 (1972).
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement has suggested that a reasonable
arrest-to-trial interval for most felony cases would be approximately 70 days. TASK FORCE
REPORT: COURTS, supra note 14, at 86-87. In contrast, rarely in the past has an innocent
person in England subjected to an arrest-to-trial interval in excess of 50 days. E. GIBSON,
TIME SPENT AWAITING TRIAL 9 (Table 6) (London 1960).
16 TAsK FORCE REPORT: COURTS, supra note 14, at 136.
17 The data appearing in this chart was compiled from the UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR
THE UNITED STATES 105 (1968) and 114 (1970). With regard to the number of acquittals
and dismissals occurring at the Federal District Court level alone during 1967 and 1968, the
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
260, 263 (1967) and 261, 263 (1968) provides the following illuminating statistics:
Not Convicted
Total Acquitted by
Court Defendants Total Dismissed Court Jury
'68 1,892 514 282 93 139
Dist. of
Columbia '67 1,011 282 149 57 76
'68 31,843 6,169 4,981 484 704
Other 89
Courts '67 31,535 5,191 4,196 409 586
[April, 19733
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Disposition of Persons Formally
Charged by Police in 1968 and 1970
% Acquitted or
Offense No. Charged Dismissed
1968 1970 1968 1970
Manslaughter
by Negligence 923 961 41.6 42.2
Forcible Rape 3,910 4,915 33.1 34.8
Robbery 19,152 23,320 20.3 23.6
Aggr. Assault 35,226 38,466 29.4 31.1
Larceny-Theft 195,672 236,495 13.8 14.5
Many factors may have combined to account for the increased percentage of
acquittals and dismissals, to wit: enlarged police forces, population and density
variations within the cities, variation in the number or type of cities surveyed,
etc., but the actual acquittal and dismissal percentages, in themselves, are sober-
ing.
Another government report concerned with the administration of federal
criminal justice contained information to the effect that in the Northern District
of California for one fiscal year alone, of the number of cases in which bail could
not be raised, as many as five acquittals resulted.' Results of still another report
pertaining to court administration in a large metropolitan area indicated that
of the 20,193 cases which were processed, as many as 2,512 defendants were not
convicted (1,467 were found not guilty and charges were dismissed in the other
1,045 cases).'9
In many instances a defendant is acquitted simply because the police appre-
hend the wrong person. One reason for this is human error--especially on the
part of eyewitnesses. For instance, an analysis of testimony of 20,000 persons
who were asked to describe the physical characteristics of the man they saw
commit a crime revealed that, on the average, they overestimated the height by
five inches, the age by eight years, and gave the wrong hair color in 82 per cent
of the cases."0
18 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMmrrTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF FEDERAL CRITiNAL JUsTIcE 142 (1963). Although on its face this fact does not
appear earth-shattering, its true force becomes apparent when one considers that serious in-justice occurs even if only one defendant is acquitted after being unable to raise bail. The
Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966), has attempted to eliminate the pretrial
confinement of an indigent defendant solely on the grounds of his inability to raise bail by
authorizing liberal release on recognizance in noncapital cases without conventional bail bond.
Under the Act, accused persons may be detained if the judge finds that no one or more con-
ditions for pretrial release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger
to any other person in the community. It should be observed, however, that while the federally
charged indigent defendant is covered by the Act, the umbrella of protection has not yet been
extended by the majority of states to defendants charged with state offenses.
19 TAsK FORcE REPORT: CouRTs, supra note 14, at 130.
20 J. FRANx, NOT GuILTY 61 (1957). See also E. Borchard's work, supra note 5, in which
the author catalogues 65 criminal prosecutions where the defendant was erroneously convicted,
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The combined force of these facts compels the conclusion that there is a
significant number of persons arrested today who may be completely innocent
of the crime of which they are charged or who may have been arrested and
charged without probable cause.
C. Damages Incurred
There are literally hundreds of cases in which trial delay has inflicted arbi-
trary cruelty. For example, in one instance a man was jailed on a serious charge
on Christmas Eve. Since he could not afford bail, he was compelled to spend
101 days in jail before being brought to a hearing. At the hearing, the com-
plainant admitted that the charge was false. In another case, a man spent two
months in jail and thereafter was acquitted at his trial. During that two-month
period, he lost his job, his car, and his family ties were broken. He was unable
to find another job for four months.2 ' These are just two of the many examples
in which persons have suffered both pecuniary and nonpecuniary injuries at the
hands of a criminal justice system which currently provides no adequate means
by which an injured person may be made whole again. The problem is perhaps
most acute where indigent defendants are involved.
In 1970 the United States Commission on Civil Rights under the direc-
tion of Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, C.S.C., issued a controversial eye-widening
report which cast grave doubts as to whether Mexican Americans were being
granted any of their pretrial constitutional rights--much less their prompt trial
right.2 2 As the report disclosed, part of the problem stems from the fact that
Mexican Americans, a predominantly migrant people, constitute a concentrated,
not yet fully assimilated, ethnic group, a substantial number of whom are rela-
tively poor, uneducated, and significantly impeded by a formidable language
barrer.i 3 When they come in contact with the criminal justice system and re-
quire the assistance of an attorney, they almost invariably qualify financially for
State-appointed counsel. According to the report, it is at this point that their
troubles may just begin. Either they are encouraged by their appointed counsel
to enter guilty pleas-thereby accelerating the criminal process, or, because
their appointed counsel is overburdened with other work or is lacking in experi-
ence in the criminal area, they are simply forgotten-thereby protracting the
the tragic error being attributed to misidentification of the accused by the victim of the crime
of violence. Id. at xiii.
As an interesting sidelight, a lawyer who conducted a prison study in the states of New
Jersey and Pennsylvania reported that of the 146 prisoners interviewed, 23 percent claimed
complete innocence of the crime for which they were serving. The mean average number of days
the New Jersey group had spent in jail pending trial was 81.71--considerably in excess of the
de minimis figure recommended by the President's Commission. A. TREBACH, THE RATIONING
OF JusTIcF 248, 263 (1964).
21 This example and the one preceding were reported in 2 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 819 (June 27, 1966).
22 REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: MExicA- AMERICANS AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST (1970).
23 The Mexican Americans living in Arizona, California, Colorado, and Texas constitute
the largest minority group in that part of the United States-approximately 4,000,000 people.
In Texas alone, of the 1,426,358 Spanish surnamed population, 13.6 percent have an annual
income of less than $1,000. Id. at x. The educational statistics appearing in the chart on the
next page are, at best, extremely discomforting.
[April, 1973T
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process 4 A trial delay indemnity system could conceivably assist in rectifying
the latter situation.
Notwithstanding these existing pretrial injustices as reported by the Civil
Rights Commission, some might argue that in view of the changes recommended
by the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice, the Mexican American or other indigent person charged with an offense
would be guaranteed a speedy trial, and that damages relating to trial delay
would therefore be nonexistent or, if existent, of an inconsequential nature.
True, suggested and currently operative innovations such as: (1) eliminating
bail (replaced by release on recognizance), (2) imposing pretrial detention
only in abnormal circumstances, 2' (3) setting a maximum allowable interval
between arrest and trial, and (4) requiring absolute discharge of accused upon
lapse of interval, 6 would in theory leave little room for possible prejudice of an
innocent person's rights. In practice, however, these safeguards-assuming all
of them were adopted-might in fact deprive the very rights they would be
attempting to protect 27
More specifically, the absolute discharge rule favored by the American Bar
Association unreasonably frustrates the interests of society in bringing criminals
to justice, and at the same time prejudices the innocent defendant who has not
Education Level of Spanish Surnamed
.Population of Three Texas Counties (1960)
No. over 25 Median edu-
yrs. old with cation level
Span. Surnamed 5-7 yrs. of of those over
County Population school 25 yrs old
Cameron 96,744 14,818 3.9
Hidalgo 129,092 16,636 3.3
Willacy 13,734 1,461 2.8
Id. at 42.
24 Id. at 55-56.
25 These two liberal procedures were crystallized into law by the Federal Bail Reform Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966). See text accompanying note 18, supra.
26 These two innovations have been recommended by the ABA PRojECT ON MINIMUm
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL (Approved
Draft) 9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA TRIAL STANDARDS].
27 To illustrate how these safeguards might explode in the face of their proponents, it would
be well to consider the following hypothetical. Suppose, for example, that a Mexican American
formerly convicted of several petty offenses were erroneously arrested by federal officials for his
alleged involvement in the smuggling of narcotics into Texas from Mexico. Even though the
man had been mistakenly identified and the police had been misinformed, his right to personal
liberty would still be preserved since he would most probably be eligible for release on recog-
nizance under the Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966). Moreover, assuming
that he was drawing a meager income, he would also be eligible for a State-paid defense at-
torney under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964). Now suppose further that his
State-appointed counsel, burdened with other legal matters, was not as attentive as he should
have been and did not notice that the federal court-through administrative error-had
scheduled his client's trial a few days beyond the maximum allowable arrest-to-trial interval.
Upon the lapse of the interval and a granting of a motion for absolute discharge, the indigent
accused would realize only a Pyrrhic victory. On the debit side he might have experienced
loss of job, loss of reputation, and ruptured family ties, and on the credit side he could only
inscribe "freedom from subsequent prosecution" for that offense. An innocent man should not
have to bear this outlandish, exorbitant cost of government error. For a real-life example of
the ridiculous extent to which court inefficiency may be carried, see the case of Charles Harling,
Navarro and Taylor, suprz note 12, at 47.
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had the benefit of a trial in order to clear his name, nor the prospect of com-
pensation for damages incurred. In Barker v. Winga, a 1972 Supreme Court
case pertaining to the prompt trial right, Mr. Justice Powell noted in the majority
opinion:
The amorphous quality of the [speedy trial] right also leads to the
unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right
has been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means
that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without
having been tried....
... . This type of rule is also recommended by the American Bar
Association.2 8
In essence, Justice Powell is saying that the absolute discharge rule fails because
it prevents justice from running its course. By its application, society is auto-
matically precluded from redressing wrongs after the lapse of the de minimis
period. In contrast, the proposed trial delay indemnity scheme would permit
the defendant to come to trial-even after the lapse of the de minimis period-
and, upon acquittal, to be eligible for just compensation. In this way the rights
of both society and the accused would be protected. Society would be allowed
the opportunity of determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant, and if
innocent, the defendant would be placed in his original prearrest position
through compensation. This is perhaps the clearest single basis for justifying a
trial delay indemnity system.
IV. Designing Legislation
Before one undertakes the immense task of spearheading legislation into a
relatively uncharted area, it is essential to look to the results of previous expedi-
tions and to the master cartographers who have traced the contours and identi-
fied the danger zones. In view of this, most of the discussion which follows will
be devoted to the analysis of several public compensation statutes which are
related materially to the proposed trial delay indemnity scheme. Useful criteria
and conditions will be extracted from the statutes and supplemented by con-
stitutional interpretations of the United States Supreme Court and other federal
courts. By observance and application of these guidelines it is hoped that the
28 407 U.S. 514, 522-23 (1972). Aside from Justice Powel's concern over the possibility
of emancipating a guilty person, the absolute discharge rule flounders for yet another reason in
relation to an innocent defendant. ABA TrAL STANDARDS, supra note 26, § 4.1 provides:
If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as
extended by excluded periods, the consequence should be absolute discharge. Such
discharge should forever bar prosecution for the offense charged and for any other
offense required to be joined with that offense. Failure of the defendant or his counsel
to move for discharge prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty should constitute waiver
of the right to speedy trial. (Emphasis supplied.)
The requirement for either the defendant or his counsel-after the lapse of the fixed interval-to
move for discharge prior to trial or entry of a guilty plea is basically unsound-particularly
from the standpoint of the indigent defendant. It is unsatisfactory because in many cases failure
to make such motion could be attributable to counsel's inattentiveness or the defendant's educa-
tional handicap. See educational statistics, supra note 23, and cited matter supra note 24.
Under these circumstances, a perfectly innocent man could conceivably go to trial after the
lapse of the maximum interval and be convicted, erroneously, of a crime, or on the other hand,
he might be acquitted and sustain substantial pecuniary injuries.
[April, 1973]
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fundamental requisites of a viable trial delay indemnity system will of necessity
emerge.
A. Survey of Related Statutes
1. ERRONEOUS CONVICTION COMPENSATION STATUTES
Since the turn of the century, the plight of the erroneously convicted and
imprisoned person has been mitigated in several jurisdictions by the enactment
of special compensation statutes. " The chart appearing on the following page
lays out in some detail a sampling of such schemes."
29 At the federal level, the first United States legislator to attempt enactment of an er-
roneous conviction compensation statute was Senator Sutherland from Utah (later an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court) in 1912. The bill was ultimately defeated and it
was not until 1938 that a federal act was passed regarding the subject. See Comment, Criminal
Law-State Indemnity for Miscarriage of Criminal Justice, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. IRv. 422, 425
(1946).
30 The chart is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather representative. All the statutes
appearing therein are currently effective except that of North Dakota. It should be noted
that many states which have no legislated system for compensating erroneously convicted persons
indemnify such individuals by special enactment. Such a procedure is lengthy, and the results
are often haphazard and inadequate. See Comment, Persons Erroneously Convicted, 13 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rlv. 451, 453 (1939).
The French and German chart provisions may be found in Volumes 7 and 10, respectively,
CorPARATIVE Cm umiNAL LAw PROJECT, THE AmERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES.
NOTES
EN 0
~t0 0 0 -g
0 0 0
0-
000
0. J 0 ba L &9 E , , 4- , p
0- 0 V1 - -
0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0c'E ,-,-2 *
0~ 0 l2 4
0
z ;4a 00 .
0o2~
~'0 0320
10 0 ,
0 U.Ar 00o,0 ~
bu 0 r .
at0
U2 0 >
~~~- 2 S =O 00 .. O
.',Ea .. 0 z 0.2 0
(Z) -. '. 0. 0
o 202OH o 0 00
k5 0 a-,797
2.0 0 , 08
00 -
V
004
0-0
0. C. d
[Vol. 48:936]
It will be observed from an inspection of the chart that eligibility require-
ments among the surveyed jurisdictions vary only slightly. Under all the systems,
to be entitled to compensation, the person must have been convicted of a crimi-
nal offense and thereafter found to be innocent of the offense charged. The
only significant variation is contained in the German statute which extends eligi-
bility only to charged persons who have been acquitted at trial or, alternatively,
against whom a prosecution has been discontinued. Note also that under the
German scheme, a person charged is ineligible for indemnification if he is ordered
to a State institution for cure or care - the underlying theory evidently being
that the State has discharged its duty to the individual by providing adequate
medical care. California is the only one of the surveyed jurisdictions which
specifically limits eligibility to persons erroneously convicted of a felony. The
other jurisdictions apparently compensate whether the offense is a misdemeanor
or a felony.
The bodies appointed by the statutes to review claims generally fall into
one of three categories: (1) special board appointed and chaired by the gover-
nor, (2) a special court, or (3) a court of claims. The United States and New
York utilize a court of claims for review purposes.
With regard to proof and procedure, California is the only jurisdiction
which specifically permits the Attorney General to introduce evidence in opposi-
tion to the claim, though such permission may be tacitly implied from the other
statutes. Three states (New York, North Dakota, and Wisconsin) require that
compensation be allowed only where innocence is predicated upon evidence or
circumstances arising after the claimant's conviction. As an additional pre-
requisite to compensation in California, the Board must find that either the
crime with which the claimant was charged was not committed, or if committed,
was not committed by the claimant. In Wisconsin and North Dakota, the Board
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the claimant was innocent
of the offense charged. Finally, under the majority of the American jurisdictions
surveyed, the petitioner waives his right to indemnity where it can be shown
that he in any way contributed to the bringing about of his own arrest or con-
viction.
As to the type of damages compensable, the California statute is the only
one which makes reference to the subject with any degree of specificity, but
even that reference-"pecuniary injury"-is decidedly vague.
Maximum amount of damages awardable to successful claimants ranges
from $2000 in North Dakota to an unstated limit in French, German, and New
York jurisdictions ' The New York statute, though silent with regard to the
exact amount, stipulates that the award should be sufficient to place the defend-
ant in the same position as if the indictment, information, or complaint had
been dismissed at the conclusion of the trial."2 North Dakota and Wisconsin,
31 It's worthy of note in this regard that a 1969 amendment in California increased the
maximum indemnity from $5,000 to $10,000.
32 Although the beneficent nature of this provision may be admired, it seems to be beyond
the realm of practicality. Conceivably under such a provision, the government which had been
responsible for wrongfully convicting a prominent businessman could be held liable to the
claimant-just on a lost wage theory-in an amount in excess of several hundred thousands
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while establishing a maximum award, also permit the Board to submit the claim
to the legislature for consideration when in the members' opinion-and in view
of the circumstances of the case-the statutory maximum award is inadequate.
Additional provisions of considerable interest are contained in the French
statute. As indicated in the chart under the French scheme damages are paid to
the successful claimant by the State which in turn has recourse to institute an
action for recovery against the civil party, accuser, or false witness through whose
fault the conviction arose. Furthermore, by the incorporation of a specific pro-
vision, not only does the erroneously convicted person have a right to bring a
claim against the State, but so also do his legal heirs. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, upon the request of a successful claimant, the facts of his innocence
and associated indemnity award are given wide publicity.
2. PRELIMINARY DETENTION COMPENSATION STATUTES
As noted previously in the introduction, several European countries and
municipalities have enacted legislation which provides for the compensation of
innocent pretrial detainees.13 Representative of the European enactments is the
German statute, the major provisions of which are illustrated in the chart on the
next page. It should be noted that according to the provisions of this statute, a
of dollars if the claimant had been imprisoned for several years. There is a social duty to
compensate, but there also exists a legislative duty in this case to draw a line!
33 See note 6, supra. Although France does not currently have such a statute in force, it
would be presumptuous to infer from this that no effort along these lines has ever been made.
In 1890 a bill was put forward in France to provide indemnity for persons falsely arrested and
prosecuted. The bill, in part, read, "Any person victim of an arrest, of a prosecution or con-
demnation recognized as an error is entitled to an indemnity equal to the damage that be
incurred." The bill was defeated by a vote of 405-83. Voltaire must have turned over in his
grave. See Loubre, French Left-Wing Radicals and the Law As a Social Force, 1870-1900,
8 AM. J. LEGAL HST. 54, 65 (1964).
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person satisfies the basic requirements for eligibility if he has been: (1) pre-
liminarily detained and subsequently acquitted or (2) found to be the subject of
an arrest based upon inadequate probable cause. A legal dependent of a deceased,
but otherwise eligible, claimant is also entitled to institute a proceeding under the
act. But notwithstanding the basic requirements for eligibility, it is clear from
the statute that claims advanced under certain conditions can nevertheless be
summarily excluded. For example, no claim exists where the petitioner has con-
tributed actively or negligently to the bringing about of his detention. Moreover,
a claim is subject to rejection where circumstances reflect that the petitioner has
been detained while in the preparation stage of an offense or was the subject of
police surveillance. Finally, a claim under the statute may be dismissed if the
petitioner has been subject to previous confinement as specified35
In reference to damages, recovery under the act is limited to "financial
34 German Law Concerning Compensation for Preliminary Detention Innocently Suffered,
July 14, 1904 as reproduced in G. MUELLER & F. LE PooLE-GRIFFrrHs, supra note 7, at
109-11.
35 Of the reasons stipulated for excluding claims, this one seems to evade comprehension
and logic. The claimant who has been previously confined is generally a prime candidate for
erroneous preliminary detention. Once branded a convict, he naturally becomes suspect if
connected even remotely with a crime. As one writer notes:
... Labeling a person a criminal may set in motion a course of events which will
increase the probability of his becoming or remaining one. The attachment of
criminal status itself may be so prejudicial and irreversible as to ruin the future of a
person who previously had successfully made his way in the community . .... TAsK
FORCE REPORT: COURTs, supra note 14, at 5.
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damage suffered," and no effort is made elsewhere in the statute to clarify the
term. No maximum amount of damages is specified, but the act clearly stipulates
that no recovery is possible where the claimant was committed to a state institu-
tion for cure or care. Of prime significance is the special provision eviscerating the
basis of a claim where public interest-regardless of the nature of the offense-
required temporary commitment.
3. CRIMINAL VICTIM COMPENSATION STATUTES
In the last decade, government programs designed to compensate innocent
victims of crime have been steadily gathering momentum throughout the world.'
The first compensation program was enacted in New Zealand in 1963," 7 followed
by Great Britain in 1964.8 In this country, California was the first to adopt such
a program in 1965,"9 and other states have followed her lead. Although there is
no federal statute on criminal victim compensation currently in force, there are
indications that Congress may be at the threshold of a legislative breakthrough
with regard to the subject.4"
While the criminal victim compensation statutes are not directly related to
the theme of indemnifying the innocent, they do provide assistance in establishing
eligibility and damage criteria for the proposed trial delay indemnity scheme.4'
The chart appearing on the next page highlights the major provisions of assorted
enactments in the United States and abroad.42
36 The theory of compensating innocent victims of crime antedates even Voltaire. Sections
22-24 of the Code of Hammurabi (about 2250 B.C.) provided a means by which victims of
robberies could be compensated by the city. See Comment, Criminal Victim Compensation in
Maryland, 30 MD. L. Rav. 266, 279 (1970).
37 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, No. 134 of 1963 (N.Z.).
38 For particulars, refer to COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, Home
Office (London 1964).
39 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13960 '(West Supp. 1970).
40 Senator Ralph Yarborough introduced the first crime victim compensation bill in
Congress in 1965 (S. 2155) and followed that with S. 646 in the 90th Congress (1967) and
S. 9 in the 91st Congress (1969). The bills failed to pass. In the 91st Congress, Senate
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield took up the cudgel and introduced S. 4576, then reintroduced
substantially the same bill in the 92d Congress (S. 750). The only significant difference between
the Yarborough and Mansfield bills seems to be that under the latter, the Commission could
make grants to share up to 75 percent of the cost of crime victim compensation programs
established by the states.
Other senators have introduced similar legislation in the 92d Congress. Senator Hartke's
bill (S. 2856) would provide compensation nationwide for crimes at both state and federal
levels with no ceiling on the amount of compensation. It would include compensation for both
psychiatric care and pain and suffering. In addition, under Senator Hartke's proposal, the
Commission would make matching grants to the states on a 90-10 basis for crime victim
compensation programs. A bill recently introduced by Senator McClellan (S. 2994) is used
as a basis for comparison in this work because it seems to provide a reasonable compromise
proposal. See Kass, Compensation for Victims of Crime, 58 A.B.A.J. 968, 969 (1972).
41 Perhaps the criminal victim compensation statutes are more analogous to our study than
first impression might suggest. Is not an innocent person who has been arrested and detained
an unreasonable length of time, a victim of a crime-the crime of which he was erroneously
accused? Moreover, there seems to exist as much or more justification for funding an indemnity
scheme which compensates victims who have been injured by an arm of society (the criminal
justice system) than there is for financing a system which indemnifies the victims of the free
acts of criminals over whom society may exert little or no control.
42 Although not represented on the chart, French criminal procedure permits a person
who personally has suffered physical harm to conduct a civil action simultaneously with the
criminal prosecution. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW PROJECT, THE AMERICAN SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 3 (1963).
The German provisions appearing in the chart may be found in 10 COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
LAw PROJECT, THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES.
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As indicated on the chart all the enactments provide for the recovery of
lost earnings (including out-of-pocket expenses) except the German statute,
which pertains essentially to damage inflicted upon the claimant's property. The
federal bill and the Maryland act provide specifically for lost future earnings. The
amount of damages recoverable ranges from $3,375 under New Zealand law to
an unstated limit in the German act. In all the jurisdictions with the exception
of Germany, the amount recoverable may be reduced by the amount of com-
pensation the claimant receives from outside sources. Emergency awards pending
decision are permitted under the federal bill, Maryland and New York acts.
Indemnity funds are apparently partially financed in one of two ways: (1)
by subrogating the State to the claimant's right of action against his offender
(federal bill, Massachusetts, New York, New Zealand acts); (2) by fining the
offender, if apprehended and convicted, to a degree commensurate with his
economic condition (California act). The state of Maryland, as a novel solution,
has increased every criminal fine (excluding motor vehicle and game regulation
offenses) by $5.00.
Under all the statutes a surviving dependent is a proper claimant, and under
the American enactments there is a statute of limitations governing the period in
which a claim may be asserted. Eligibility is tainted under the federal bill,
Massachusetts and New Zealand laws if the claimant in any way contributed to
the infliction of his injuries.
B. Criteria
Having briefly analyzed and compared provisions of compensation statutes
related to the proposed trial delay indemnity system (hereinafter also referred to
as TDI), we are now somewhat better prepared to direct our attention to the
task of establishing basic criteria for prototype legislation.
As alluded to previously in this discussion, the theory of compensating the
innocent for trial delay is premised on the notion of the defendant's constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial. Under a TDI system this prompt
trial is quantified into a maximum time interval referred to as a de minimis
standard. Provided that an individual has satisfied certain eligibility requirements,
he is entitled to prove and recover damages he has sustained as a result of delay
beyond the minimum permissible interval. The several elements of this right of
recovery will be discussed separately in relation to the proposed legislation.
1. THE DE Mnumis STANDARD
a. Legitimacy
The practice of establishing maximum time intervals in order to identify
violation of a defendant's prompt trial right is not new. Several states presently
have such time limits in effect and have had them for many years. 43 Until recently
43 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382 (West 1970) (15 days from date held to answer to filing of
information, 60 days from filing of information to trial); ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5(a)
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the Supreme Court of the United States had avoided the question of quantifying
the speedy trial right into a number of days, months, or court terms." In 1972,
however, Mr. Justice Powell writing the majority opinion in Barker v. Wingo in
effect legitimated the practice with respect to the states when he commented:
We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can
be quantified into a specified number of days or months. The States, of
course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional
standards, but our approach must be less precise.45 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is not altogether clear from this statement what the Supreme Court's view
would be if the United States Congress passed a law establishing maximum
tolerances for trial delay, though a calculated guess would be that the Court
would have to honor such tolerances if they were "consistent with constitutional
standards."
b. Designation of Interval
Obviously, any one of several time intervals could be selected for a TDI
system (i.e., arrest-to-final disposition, arrest-to-trial, indictment-to-trial, etc.),
but the one which appears to be best geared to TDI needs is arrest-to-trial.
The date of arrest or date of formal charge in cases where no actual arrest
occurs, seems to be a logical starting point for the interval in view of a 1971 U.S.
Supreme Court decision, United States u. Marion, in which the Court laid down
the rule that the sixth amendment speedy trial guarantee does not attach until a
person is charged or arrested." The American Bar Association in formulating
speedy trial standards had previously recommended the same starting point.r
As to the selection of the opposite-end point for the interval, the date of the
commencement of the trial seems appropriate in view of society's interest in bring-
ing the issues before a tribunal within a reasonable period of time. Delay oc-
curring during the trial should be an issue for consideration in determining the
amount of damages to be awarded to an innocent individual. This selection is
(1965) (120 days from arrest); MAss. LAWs. ANN. ch. 277, § 72 (1956) (6 months from
time of imprisonment or bail); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 '(1964) (6 months from commit-
ment); WAsH. Rv. CoDE §§ 10.37.020, 10.46.010 (1961) (30 days from date held to answer
to indictment or information, 60 days from indictment or information to trial). See ABA TaIAL
STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 14-15.
44 The reason for the Court's heretofore adamant position in this regard is best explained
by a consideration of its holding in Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959). See note 10,
sup ra.
45 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972).
46 404 U.S. 307, 321 '(1971). It should be noted that this rule might be considered as a
minimum standard to be observed by the states under the decision of Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967) which made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to a speedy trial.
47 ABA TRrAL STANDARDS, supra note 26, § 2.2 (a) provides in part:
The time for trial should commence running, without demand by the defendant,
as follows:(a) from the date the charge is filed, except that if the defendant has been con-
tinuously held in custody or on bail or recognizance until that date to answer for
the same crime or a crime based on the same conduct or arising from the same
criminal episode, then the time for trial should commence running from the date he
was held to answer ....
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supported by Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
implements the sixth amendment and authorizes dismissal at the court's discretion
if there is unnecessary delay in charging the defendant or unnecessary delay in
bringing the defendant to trial.4" While the implication of the Federal Rule is by
no means conclusive, the date of the commencement of trial does seem to be a
reasonable choice and is in consonance with the basic purposes of the indemnifica-
tion system.
c. Length of Interval
Several States, it was noted, have already established maximum tolerable
intervals of delay--some in days or months, some in court terms. The American
Bar Association suggests that the de minimis standard be expressed in terms of
months or daysrather than court terms, because under the former methods it is
easier to determine whether the interval has lapsed.4" What should be obvious,
though, is that no single time interval can be designated or recommended for
blanket application in all jurisdictions." De minimis standards should be estab-
lished according to conditions peculiar to individual jurisdictions; and within
those jurisdictions, standards should vary as to the type of offense involved51 and
as to the pretrial disposition of the defendant (i.e., detention, bail, or recog-
nizance) .2
In 1968 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice published a report which contained a model timetable for felony
cases. In it the Commission suggested that a reasonable maximum time interval
from arrest to trial should be approximately 70 days and that a reasonable time
interval between arrest and final disposition should be about four months."
Although these guidelines are by no means feasible for every jurisdiction, they
provide a rule of thumb by which various jurisdictions can measure their admin-
istrative efficiency in relation to their judicial obligations to defendants.
2. ELIGIBILITY
a. Finding of Innocence
One of the foremost considerations in establishing eligibility requirements
for a TDI scheme is to provide an absolute shield against the possibility of re-
munerating a guilty person. Consequently, a condition precedent to recovery
should be a finding of innocence. Such a determination could be made by a
48 But see Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REv. 1587, 1589-90
(1965) wherein the writer contends that no court would give much weight to this implication
of Rule 48(b).
49 ABA TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 14. The Committee rejected the court-term
technique as a holdover from the circuit riding days which often results in lack of uniformity
and much misunderstanding in application.
50 Id.
51 Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REv. 476, 499 (1968). See also
Justice Powells remarks in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972).
52 TASK FORE REPORT: CouRTs, supra note 14, at 85.
53 Id. at 84, 86, 87.
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judge or jury by means of a special verdict upon a person's acquittal. Borrowing
from the North Dakota and Wisconsin erroneous conviction compensation
statutes, innocence might be judged on a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
In consonance with the California erroneous conviction compensation statute,
the term "innocence" might signify that either the crime with which the defendant
was charged had not been committed, or if committed, was not committed by the
defendant, and, in any case, that the defendant did not contribute to the bringing
about of his arrest.'
Admittedly, the joint requirement of a de minimis standard and a finding of
innocence could work a serious hardship on the innocent person whose case is
dismissed for lack of evidence or for other reasons before the lapse of the de
minimis period. Moreover, the finding of innocence requirement alone would
give rise to an apparently inequitable situation where the dismissal would occur
after the running of the period, but prior to or during the trial. Unfortunately,
no completely adequate provision can be made for persons whose cases are dis-
missed under these two circumstances, though one partial solution in the second
situation might be to permit the dismissed individual to recover damages upon a
showing that his arrest was not based upon probable cause,"s or that it was
brought about fraudulently by another person or persons.
Similarly in those states which automatically discharge persons upon the
lapse of the period, the requirement of a finding of innocence would be equally
harsh. Thus, to offset this inequality, persons so discharged could-under a TDI
system-have the right to opt for trial in order to clear their names and possibly
to qualify for compensation if acquitted.5" It is doubtful that many persons,
guilty or innocent, would take advantage of such an option, but still, that course
of action should be available.
b. Cause of Delay
A petitioner seeking relief from the government for trial delay should be
required to come to the court with "dean hands." This tenet, originally espoused
in United States v. Lustman57 in 1958 and echoed in Barker u. Wingo5 in 1972,
54 Such is the case under the California erroneous conviction compensation statute. See
E.C.C. Chart supra in text. Notice also that three other jurisdictions (Federal, North Dakota,
and Wisconsin) deny eligibility to a person who contributed to the bringing about of his own
arrest (and conviction). This is an important consideration in a trial delay indemnity arrange-
ment because it is conceivable that a person might intentionally cause himself to be arrested
with a view to collecting indemnity when subsequently acquitted.
55 This solution is derived from a combination of eligibility provisions under the German
erroneous conviction compensation statute which authorizes the indemnification of an innocent
person where the prosecution has been discontinued, and the German preliminary detention
compensation statute which permits compensation of persons arrested without probable cause.
See E.C.C. and P.D.C. Charts supra in text. That dismissal is a relatively commonplace pro-
cedure, particularly at the federal district court level, is dramatically illustrated by the sta-
tistics presented in note 17, supra.
56 A provision such as this would ameliorate the innocent defendanes position with respect
to the absolute discharge rules currently in effect in several states and presently lauded by the
American Bar Association. See text accompanying notes 27 and 28, supra. Some of the statedischarge statutes currently in force include: N. D. CENT. CODE § 29-18-06 (1959); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-51-6 (1953). Ambiguity exists in much of the discharge legislation as to
whether a subsequent prosecution may be brought. See Annot., 50 A. L. R.2d 943 '(1956).
57 258 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
58 407 U.S. at 529. For a diluted, perhaps more rational approach to the "clean hands"
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prescribes that where delay is attributable to the defendant, he thereby waives his
right to a speedy trial. While such a rule possesses some merit, it is ostensibly too
severe and inflexible as applied to a TDI system. Perhaps the better rule is the
one which has been adopted by the American Bar Association whereby defendant-
caused delay and delay due to exceptional circumstances are excluded in the
computation of the delay to be measured against the de minimis standard. For
example, suppose that in a particular jurisdiction an arrest-to-trial de minimis
standard for the defendant's specific offense and pretrial disposition is 80 days.
Assume further that 100 days have already elapsed since the defendant's arrest,
but a delay of 30 days has been caused by the defendant's request for a con-
tinuance. In this case then, only 70 days of delay could be attributed to the
government, which figure does not exhaust the statutory 80-day de innimis
period. Thus, for TIM purposes, the only delay which gives rise to a defendant's
cause of action for indemnity is not the extent of the de minimis standard in its
strict sense, but rather the length of government-caused, or effective delay, as
measured against the de minimis standard. Where effective delay exceeds the
standard, excessive delay results. It is this latter increment of delay which forms
the basis of an indemnity claim. Additionally, the amount of excessive delay is
a factor in determining the amount of damages awardable in any given circum-
stance.
c. Type of Delay
If in a specific case the measure of effective delay is computed and found to
be in excess of the de minimis standard, the question then arises as to whether
the effective delay must have been imposed in any special manner in order to
qualify the defendant for an indemnity action.
In the past, federal courts have used the terms "purposeful or oppressive" '59
and "culpable"6 to describe reprehensible government-caused delay, but in the
recent Barker case, the Supreme Court eased this requirement by "placing the
primary burden on the courts and the prosecutors"' to assure that cases are
brought to trial within a reasonable time. The "reasonable time" aspect of the
indemnity scheme is, of course, pre-established by the de minimis standard. The
mere fact that the de minimis standard is exceeded should raise the presumption
of unreasonableness. Thus, it stands to reason that an individual bringing a claim
for indemnity should not be required to show that the delay was imposed in an
oppressive or culpable manner.
d. Demand-Waiver
Several states rely on what is referred to as the demand-waiver doctrine in
ascertaining at what point in time the defendant's right to a speedy trial has been
doctrine, see ABA TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 26, § 2.3.
59 Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) ; United States v. Penn, 267 F. Supp.
912, 913 (E.D. La. 1967).
60 Fleming v. United States, 378 F.2d 502, 504 (1st Cir. 1967).
61 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972).
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violated. 2 Generally, the doctrine provides that a defendant waives his right to
a speedy trial for any period prior to which he or his attorney has not demanded
trial. Recently, in Barker v. Winrgo, the Supreme Court denounced such a rule
as inconsistent with other Court decisions on waiver of constitutional rights-
specifically the decisions in Miranda v. Arizona6 and Boykin v. Alabama." At
one point in the Barker opinion Mr. Justice Powell remarked:
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty
as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.
Moreover, for reasons earlier expressed, society has a particular interest in
bringing swift prosecutions, and society's representatives are the ones who
should protect that interest0 5
It should be clear from this that, under a TDI scheme, no requirement for de-
fendant's demand for a speedy trial should exist.
3. PROOF AND PROCEDURE
a. Reviewer of Claim
From the analysis of the various compensation statutes, it was determined
that in most cases claims for indemnity are reviewed by a specially designated
board, a court of claims, or a special court. For purposes of drafting legislation
with respect to TDI, a court of claims will be used, though individual states might
find one of the other alternatives best tailored to their needs.
b. Burden of Proof
Assuming that an individual brings a claim for damages, advancing evidence
of: (1) a finding of innocence, or a dismissal when excessive delay exists and lack
of probable cause or fraudulent arrest is shown; (2) the existence of a de
minmisperiod for his particular offense and pretrial disposition; and (3) that
the measure of effective delay of his trial exceeds the de minimis standard, a
presumption of government liability should arise until the state can discharge its
burden of proof. In order to rebut this presumption, the government should be
required to show that any or all of the three above state elements are unfounded.
c. Standard of Proof
The question of standard of proof to be required of the government is not
immediately answerable without some background discussion. Although at first
impression the appropriate standard would appear to be the normal civil, or
preponderance of evidence standard, there are other considerations.
In 1967 the Supreme Court handed down a decision which tends to cloud
62 See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 326 (1958).
63 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
64 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
65 407 U.S. at 527 (footnotes omitted).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
the issue of a proper selection of a standard of proof in a TDI scheme. The
case was Chapman u. California and in it the Court formulated what is now
referred to as the "harmless-error" rule. Stated simply, the rule is that before a
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Since the de
minimis standard is premised on the concept of minimum rights afforded by the
Constitution, and when exceeded, constitutional harm is presumed and the bur-
den of proof is shifted to the prosecution, it seems to follow that the prosecution
should have to discharge its burden of proof on a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. Despite the fact that this standard appears to be unusually stringent, it
evidently is the one adopted by the Supreme Court to ensure the safeguard of
constitutional rights. Under the TDI system then, if the government is unable
to discharge its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, government liability
is established and the claimant is then entitled to plead and prove damages.
4. DAmAGEs
a. Type of Damages
As to the issue of damages, the onus of proof should of course be on the
claimant. Recovery should be allowed for any pecuniary injury suffered which
is of the type normally awardable under the public compensation statutes.6"
Compensable pecuniary injury should include the following:
(1) lost wages 6
(2) expense of litigation69
(3) other incurred expenses"0
In addition a graduated award scale based upon excessive delay should be
established. By such scale a claimant could be compensated for mental anguish
and tainted reputation in proportion to the nature of the crime of which he was
accused and to the protracted delay of his trial. Although such an award system
would by its very nature be arbitrary, at least some compensation for non-
pecuniary injury would flow to the defendant."'
66 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See generally Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L.
Rv. 83 (1967).
67 See criteria as to type of damages, P.D.C., C.V.C., and E.C.C. (California) Charts,
supra in text.
68 This expression, of course, encompasses wages lost during the de minimis period. Lost
future earnings due to a successful claimant's inability to find immediate employment are not
included because of the impossibility of quantifying such a recovery before the fact.
69 This of course would not be awarded where the claimant proceeded with State-appointed
counsel. Note that the state of California specifically provides for the reimbursement of at-
torney fees, C.V.C. Chart, supra in text. Such provision for litigation expenses gathers even
more importance when one considers that key defense witnesses may have to be transported
great distances to appear at trial.
70 An example of such an expense would be where a widower with children was incarcer-
ated and his trial was delayed. Reasonable expenses incurred by a relative of the defendant
in caring for the children in the father's absence would be a proper matter for compensation.
71 Hopefully, this would provide a compromise between the complete lack of recovery for
nonpecuniary injuries under the public compensation statutes surveyed and Senator Hartk&s
proposal for a no-ceiling measure in criminal victim compensation legislation. See generally
E.C.C., P.D.C., and C.V.C. Charts supra in text and note 40, supra.
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b. Measure of Damages
Unlike the New York erroneous conviction compensation statute and the
foreign versions, some upper limit on the total amount of recoverable damages
should be established. This limit would vary from state to state but in no case
should it be fixed below $5,000.2 Judgments should be appealable to the next
higher court." Additionally, it should be relatively obvious that where the maxi-
mum award authorized is grossly inadequate in a given situation, the claimant
would have recourse to obtain an incremental allowance through the legislature.
5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Present compensation statutes suggest additional provisions which should be
incorporated into the TDI scheme. First of all, TDI eligibility should not be
limited to the petitioner himself but should extend to his surviving dependents."'
It would only be on rare occasions that such a provision would come into play,
but the death of the claimant after his acquittal (or reversal of conviction at the
appeal level) and before his claim could be heard is a circumstance which should
be accommodated by the act. Eligibility should also be extended to claimants
who are concurrently serving a prison sentence on another charge. The mere
fact that a person is in prison on another charge (even if in another jurisdiction)
should not exempt the government from guaranteeing the defendant his speedy
tral right.75
A claimant who was committed to a government institution for cure or
care subsequent to his arrest and who is otherwise eligible to bring a claim for
indemnity, should have his recovery reduced by the amount of financial benefit
derived from his committal." If the government can show that due to his mental
or physical condition, the claimant would have been incapable of making any
income during the time covered by the de minimis period-even if he had not
been arrested-the government should not be liable for any damages claimed.
If the plaintiff receives compensation from outside sources, this should also be
taken into account when computing the claimant's award.77
72 The majority of American erroneous conviction compensation statutes stipulate this
amount or a higher one. Of the states surveyed, only the allowance in the North Dakota statute
dips below this figure. See E.C.C. Chart supra in text.
73 See North Dakota and Wisconsin provisions, E.C.C. Chart, supra in text.
74 See French provision (E.C.C. Chart), German provision (P.D.C. Chart), and alljurisdictions (C.V.C. Chart), supra in text.
75 The prompt trial right is extended to a person incarcerated for committing another
crime because the delay in bringing such person to trial may ultimately result in as much
oppression as is suffered by one who is jailed prior to trial. One of the obvious disadvantages
of a denial of the right is that the defendant is thereby forced to forego the possibility of serv-
ing a concurrent sentence. In addition, under present prison procedures, the duration of the
defendant's imprisonment might be increased and conditions under which he must serve his
sentence might be greatly worsened due to a pending criminal charge. Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374 (1969); see also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 '(1970). Along these lines, it should
be noted that the existence of an outstanding criminal charge no longer automatically makes a
prisoner ineligible for parole in the federal prison system. 28 C.F.R. § 2.9 (1968).
76 See German statutes, E.C.C. and P.D.C. Charts, supra in text.
77 See all jurisdictions with the exception of Germany, C.V.C. Chart, supra in text. It is
doubtful that this provision would be applicable in very many cases. However, should some
philanthropist decide to compensate a claimant personally, the government should be liable
only for the uncompensated portion of his judgment.
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Provision should be made in the TDI scheme for self-financing. Thus, in
addition to the normal right of prosecution, the government should be sub-
rogated to the cause of action of the successful claimant as against any person who
intentionally or fraudulently brought about his arrest." Fines from such con-
victions and awards from such suits should be placed in a special indemnity
fund." Such fund should also be open to private and public contributions 0 and
fines for certain designated offenses should be increased a proportionate amount
with the proceeds going to replenish the fund.8 '
Two final provisions should be included. First, where the claimant has been
found innocent and subsequently awarded delay compensation, upon his request
widest publicity should be given to this fact. 2 Secondly, where compensation of
an otherwise eligible claimant would be contrary to the public interest, the court
should be permitted to decline to award damages.s
V. Proposed Bill
The Model Bill Outline appearing below furnishes the basic framework upon
which interested lawyers and legislators might construct a workable TDI system.
The Outline is by no means intended to identify and resolve all of the per-
plexities related to trial delay indemnity, nor even to provide the most appropriate
solution to those problems already considered. Rather, it provides a basic blue-
print-a point of departure for further legislative investigation.
MODEL BILL OUTLINE-TRIAL DELAY INDEMNrTY
§ 1. Purpose
The objective of this Act is to provide a means by which individuals
whose trials have been delayed excessively by the State, and who are
subsequently found innocent or dismissed, may be compensated by the
State to the extent of pecuniary and limited non-pecuniary injuries suf-
fered by them as a result of such delay.
§ 2. Definitions
a. De minimis standard-a reasonable maximum interval of time
from date of arrest to date of trial expressed in days, fixed by law, and
varying according to specific offenses and pre-trial disposition of de-
78 See all jurisdictions except California, Maryland and Germany, C.V.C. Chart, supra
in text.
79 See California statute, C.V.C. Chart, supra in text.
80 See Federal Bill, C.V.C. Chart, supra in text.
81 See Maryland statute, C.V.C. Chart, supra in text.
82 See French statute, E.C.C. Chart, supra in text.
83 See German statute, P.D.C. Chart, supra in text. This last provision would give the
court some latitude and discretionary power where the making of an award would directly
conflict with public interest. For example, suppose the damages claimed were for wages lost
in the operation of a house of ill repute-which activity was against the law. The court should
rightly be permitted to deny such a claim.
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fendants (detention, bail, or release on recognizance). A schedule of
standards appears in the appendix to this Act."'
b. Effective delay-measure of delay computed in days, attributable
to the government. It is calculated by subtracting the amount of delay
(in days) attributable to the defendant or to exceptional circumstances
from the total amount of delay (in days).
c. Exceptional circumstances-unique, non-recurring events which
produce an inordinate number of cases for court disposition.""
d. Date of arrest-the date on which law enforcement authorities
substantially restrain the liberty of the defendant-usually the date on
which the defendant is taken into custody for the first time. In cases
where the defendant is not actually taken into custody, for purposes of
this Act, the date of arrest shall be the date of formal charge.
e. Scheduled offense-a misdemeanor or felony appearing in the
list of offenses to which de minimis standards have been applied.
f. Excessive delay--a measure of delay (in days) which is the posi-
tive mathematical result of subtracting the de minimis standard from the
measure of effective delay for a particular defendant.
g. Claimant-an individual determined by a court or jury to be
innocent, the effective delay of whose trial exceeds the appropriate de
minimis standard, or an individual qualifying under § 3 of this Act.
h. Innocent-determination beyond a reasonable doubt by the court
or by a jury in a special verdict that either: (1) the offense of which
the defendant was accused had not been committed, or (2) if com-
mitted was not committed by the defendant, and (3) that in any case
under (1) and (2), the defendant neither intentionally nor negligently
contributed to the bringing about of his arrest.
i. Indemnity-compensation paid to the claimant by the State for
pecuniary and limited non-pecuniary injuries suffered.
§ 3. Eligibility
a. Any individual who has been found innocent of a scheduled
offense and whose effective delay of trial exceeds the de minimis standard
fixed for that offense, shall be eligible to bring a claim for indemnity
against the government.
b. Any surviving dependent of an individual qualifying under § 3a
84 Although such appendix is not actually contained in the Model Bill Outline, it might
follow the format below:
Offense De Minimis Standard (in days)
Detention Bail
Murder 100 120
Robbery 80 100
Assault 70 90
etc. etc. etc.
Note that the figures used here are purely fictitious.
85 The type of circumstance envisioned here is the possibility of a large-scale riot or mass
public disorder which would cause severe docket congestion. See ABA TRAL STANDAns,
supra note 26, at 28.
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or §§3c through 3f of this Act shall also be eligible to bring such claim.
c. Any individual whose case has been dismissed and excessive
delay can be shown to exist, upon a showing of a lack of probable cause
for his arrest or of an arrest brought about by fraudulent means, shall
be entitled to bring a claim for indemnity against the government. [This
provision is applicable to states in which no absolute discharge rule
exists.]
d. Any individual who is discharged absolutely when the effective
delay of his trial exceeds or coincides with the de minimis standard may
opt for trial. Upon subsequent determination of innocence, such in-
dividual shall be entitled to bring a claim for indemnity against the
government, if he is otherwise qualified under this Act.8..
e. Any individual who is serving a prison term for another offense
shall not, for that reason alone, be prevented from taking advantage of
the provisions of this Act.
f. Any individual, otherwise eligible, who was committed to a State
institution for cure or care subsequent to his arrest shall be entitled to
bring a claim for indemnity, but his recovery of damages under this
Act shall be subject to a reduction equal to reasonable costs incurred by
the State for his cure or care.
g. All claims must be brought within [ ] months of the date of
determination of innocence, date of dismissal, or date of discharge in the
appropriate case.
h. Specific Exceptions:
(1) No claim may be advanced in any case where the in-
dividual himself contributed intentionally or negligently to the bring-
ing about of his own arrest.
(2) No claim exists where a claimant, directly or indirectly,
has intentionally, fraudulently, or otherwise frustrated the government's
orderly and expeditious prosecution of his case.
§ 4. Proof and Procedure
a. The claim of an eligible individual shall be heard by the Court of
Claims:
(1) if he was found to be innocent by special verdict at his
trial, or
(2) upon qualifying under § 3 of this Act, or
(3) if he was convicted at the trial level and the judgment
was either reversed on appeal or remanded to the trial court with a sub-
sequent finding of innocence.
b. In the event that the claimant can introduce evidence to show:
(1) the existence of a de minimis standard for his particular offense and
pre-trial disposition and (2) that the measure of effective delay of his
trial exceeded the de minimis standard, the government, in order to
86 This provision has been included for the benefit of those states which might desire to
retain the absolute discharge mechanism for specifically designated crimes.
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rebut the presumption of liability, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the claim is unfounded.
c. The Attorney General or his representative, with the permission
of the court, may be present and offer any evidence in opposition to the
claim.
d. When the judgment on the claim is final and upon the request of
the claimant, the court of claims is hereby authorized to issue press
releases publicizing the finding of innocence and the resulting indemnity
award.
e. In addition to its normal right of prosecution, the government
shall be subrogated to the right of action of any successful claimant as
against any person who intentionally or fraudulently brought about the
claimant's arrest.
§ 5. Damages
a. Once government liability has been determined in a particular
case, the claimant shall then be required to prove on a civil standard,
the measure of damages to which he is entitled.
b. Damages compensable under this Act are as follows:
(1) Pecuniary injuries
(a) lost wages
(b) expense of litigation
(c) other out-of-pocket expenses
(2) Non-pecuniary injuries. Damages for such injuries shall be
awarded on the basis of a graduated scale in proportion to the nature of
the crime of which the claimant was charged and to the measure of
excessive delay occurring in a particular case. A graduated award scale
is contained in the appendix to this Act.'
c. The Court of Claims shall reduce claimant's recovery by amounts
of compensation received by him from other sources and also by
amounts the government has already expended on his behalf beyond
ordinary maintenance costs, such as the cost of cure or care.
d. The maximum amount of damages which may be awarded to
any claimant is [ ]. Either the claimant or the government may
87 Again, though such appendix is not actually contained in the Model Bill Outline, it
might take the following form:
Maximum
Pretrial De Minimis Effective Excessive
Offense Disposition Standard Delay Delay Award
(in days) (in days) (in days)
Murder Bail 120 120-130 10 $200
131-140 20 $400
141-150 30 $600
151-160 40 $800
161-170 50 $1000
Note that the figures used here are entirely arbitrary. For crimes other than murder, the award
factor would be a lesser quantity. The factor used above for illustrative purposes is twenty
dollars.
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appeal the decision on the amount of damages to the next higher court.
e. Where an award of damages to a particular claimant would be
contrary to public interest, that is, where the damages claimed were
actually wages or income lost in the conduct of an illegal activity, the
court shall decline to make such award.
§ 6. Financing. A trial delay indemnity fund shall be established and
subsequently financed by fines and awards obtained pursuant to § 4e of
this Act. In addition, fines imposed on all offenses, with the exception of
[ ] shall be increased by an amount of [ ], and
the proceeds shall be deposited in the indemnity fund. The fund shall
be open to all contributions both public and private.
VI. Conclusion
Although many of the operational questions associated with a trial delay
indemnity scheme have been considered in the foregoing discussion, several others
await legislative examination. For instance, one prime area of concern not treated
in the Model Bill Outline is the delegation of the responsibility for bookkeeping-
that is, the keeping of records reflecting, objectively, which part of the delay is
attributable to the defendant himself and which part, to the government or to
exceptional circumstances. Another matter not fully addressed is the problem of
the determination of innocence for compensation purposes when the defendant's
case has been reversed without remand on appeal. Additionally, there are several
measures in the Outline which would be simply unadaptable by many states, such
as the provision designating the court of claims as a reviewing body. Some states
might wish to appoint a special body to hear TDI claims or to delegate the
function to some other special court.
Admittedly, a defendant's eligibility under the Outline is narrowly defined-
particularly as pertains to the requirement of a finding of innocence. This re-
quirement has been incorporated into the bill to ensure against the possibility of
a guilty person being indemnified. Some might argue that eligibility should be
expanded to include the generally acquitted defendant"8 and even the guilty
88 "Generally acquitted" in this context signifies acquitted at trial on the merits of the
case, i.e., without a requirement for a determination of "innocence," a term defined supra, §
2h Model Bill Outline.
A system expanded to compensate the generally acquitted as well as the guilty (see note
89, infra) might carry with it a collateral and unbargained for advantage, which might be
aptly termed "reverse bail." The purpose, of course, of ordinary bail is to provide the court
with assurance that the liberated accused will be present for his trial. Conversely, with reverse
bail, a defendant is provided with a modicum of certainty that his trial will be held by a certain
date, after which-if the delay has been government-caused-the defendant, whether convicted
or acquitted, is eligible for compensation for provable damages. Without reverse bail, i.e.,
without a TDI system which compensates the convicted as well as the acquitted, the tendency
is for a guilty accused to delay his trial as long as possible, which in turn makes the prospect
of jumping bail considerably more enticing. ANNUAL REPORT O THE DIRECTOR OF TEE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 268 (1970). Under an indemnity system
compensating both guilty and innocent defendants, even the most bail-jump prone criminal
might be induced to be present for his trial, or at least in the vicinity, when his trial date would
come due.
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defendant,89 since the basis for compensation under the bill is a violation of the
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Each of these suggestions has merit,
but the latter one appears to be highly idealistic in view of the criminal's generally
strained relationship with the society which he has offended.
Finally, it is submitted that, aside from the humanitarian aspect of its re-
establishing the innocent defendant in his prearrest position, a TDI mechanism
provides an absolutely essential component in the general overhaul of the
judiciary. In the federal jurisdiction and in the state jurisdictions which have
already implemented plans to compensate the erroneously convicted, such statutes
could easily be expanded to encompass the notion of indemnity for the dilatorily
acquitted (on a finding of innocence). The remaining states would have to
consider the propriety of a compensation device as their schemes for improving
their judicial administration come to fruition.
Voltaire may have been ahead of his time in suggesting that innocent de-
fendants should be compensated by the State for pretrial injustice, but in the
computer and space age where perfection and sophistication are sought in prac-
tically every commercial, industrial, and governmental endeavor, perhaps we
would not be ahead of our time in attempting to perfect our criminal justice
system and to insure it against malfunction.
John W. Cooley
89 Proponents of such an argument might ask: "Does not the right to a speedy trial apply
to all defendants, whether guilty or innocent?"; "May not a guilty defendant whose trial has
been delayed---say for two or three years--suffer exactly the same damages as an innocent
defendant?"; "Should not the guilty person also be entitled to compensation for provable
damages?"
The writer concedes that there is a possibility that a guilty person should be eligible for
compensation but only in narrowly defined circumstances. For example, if the trial of a person
is excessively delayed and he is subsequently found guilty, he should possibly be entitled to
compensation after an appellate reversal which is based upon the existence of actual prejudice
brought about by the excessive delay (i.e., failure of memories, absence or death of defense
witnesses, etc.). In other cases, however, the writer feels that the guilty person assumes the
risk of possible consequences connected with the crime when he perpetrates it, and therefore
should not be compensated for damages suffered. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that a
system providing for the compensation of the guilty might possibly encourage considerably more
not guilty pleas, thereby contributing to docket congestion.
Finally, in order to circumvent possible charges of denial of equal protection, states adopt-
ing TDI legislation could conceivably incorporate a provision which would authorize judges to
diminish proportionately the sentences of guilty persons whose trials have been excessively
delayed.
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